Saturday, January 24, 2009

Foucault's "Method"

Let me say right off the bat: I love Foucault's discussion of power. (It seems his discussion of power would function well as an introduction to this program, no?) However, a few questions arise from reading the chapter "Method." Foucault defines 'power' in terms of 'force relations', but it is unclear to me how he differentiates the two terms. He writes, "[power] is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable" (p. 93). Are not both force relations and states of power 'local and unstable'? Might this be a way of paraphrasing: "In every inequitable relation (and what relation is not inequitable?) there is power. These relations are 'force relations.' Power is constituted within them, across them, and through them."?

I wonder too about power being intentional. (Which is not to say that there are individuals or groups determining how power operates.) As I understand it: though intentional, power is never dictated. (Hence power's intelligibility.) However, power does have a logic and a system. Can any of ya'll provide me with an example of a logic or system of power? (We're not talking hegemony, right?)

I wonder also if Foucault using the word 'immanence' in a way that I am unaware of. Can one say (and is Foucault saying) power and knowledge are immanent of each other?

arrggg! i'm just throwing these ideas out there...

1 comment:

  1. hmmm....
    I'm thinking about institutions as systems of power, or structures of power. Within these structures one would find the "local and unstable" states of power generated by the force relations. I see the force relation in this quote as being largely interpersonal, though I suppose they could also be individuals against structures, but to be fair I'm grasping at straws here.

    in terms of the power/knowledge situation, they are inseparable in my mind, one can not "know" an object without engaging in power relations. To know an object is to have power over it within a discourse of the will to truth or the will to knowledge. Classification reduces an object to a static knowable form wherein the subject has power over the object. I wonder then if the opposite could be said, can one engage in dynamics of power outside of the knowledge of one relationship to power. Is it by the knowledge of power that one can engage it or does one engage in power relations regardless of knowing it? I'm leaning towards the latter but I like leaving this more open to thought at this juncture.

    just some jumbled, sleep deprived thoughts to throw into the wild mix.

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